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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENDALL Q. NORTHERN,
Case no.

920116

Petitioner,
vs.
N. ELDON BARNES,

Priority No. 13

et al.,

Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

Petitioner Kendall Q. Northern (hereinafter "Northern"), by
and through his counsel Haley & Stolebarger, hereby submits this
Reply Brief in support of his appeal from a decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals affirming judgment of the Third District Court for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT
Petitioner, Kendall Northern, is entitled to the extraordinary
relief sought based upon this Court's decision in Foote v. Utah
Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). The Board of Pardon's
own rules require that a hearing be held prior to rescission of a
parole date and that an inmate be informed of the charges against
him. see Rule 310. The Board failed to comply with these rules in
rescinding Northern's parole the day before he was to be released,
without notice of the allegations of misconduct or rule violations,
1

without a hearing that indicated that Northern would present "a
serious risk or danger to the community/1 or without providing
Northern with any information pertaining to any "new evidence" the
Board had in its possession.
Moreover, the "new evidence" that the trial court found may
have been relied upon by the Board was not "new evidence" at all,
even

as

the

trial

court

defined

new

evidence:

"negative

information." see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 8,
attached to petitioner's opening brief as Addendum A. This evidence
- a recent psychological report, a report pertaining to an incident
of drug use in February of 1988, and Northernfs drug use before and
after the commission of his crime in 1980 -

was either known to

the Board and its agents prior to May 9, 1988, and knowingly not
acted upon, or was not negative information, or both.
The Board's decision to rescind Northern's parole date the day
before he was scheduled to be released, in violation of its written
policies and procedures, was an abuse of discretion and violated
Northern's due process rights and his liberty interest in his
parole date. The Board had no rational, lawful basis in the record
to support its conclusions, and its actions were arbitrary and
capricious.
What is at issue here is the correctness of the Board of
Pardon's actions in light of the facts and/or evidence the Board
had before it in making its decision. A decision made and actions
taken upon a Board's determination that an earlier Board was not
harsh enough in meting out punishment to an inmate is not a lawful
2

basis upon which to rescind a release date under Rule 310; the
inmate's liberty interest in his release date and the binding force
of the rules outweigh a Board's desire to increase the punishment
previously set.
The facts concerning the procedures followed by the Board have
been "flushed out" in this case, see Foote at 745. Based on this
Court's decision in Foote, the facts reveal that the Board of
Pardons denied Northern his due process rights under article I,
section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution. As
such, extraordinary relief is appropriate, and Northern is entitled
to have the actions taken by the Board at the July 8, 1988, hearing
declared null and void, and the order of restitution issued by the
Board in 1992 vacated.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
NORTHERN IS ENTITLED TO THE EXTRAORDINARY
RELIEF REQUESTED BASED ON THIS COURT'S
DECISION IN FOOTE V, UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(e) (1992), Northern is
entitled

to

the

extraordinary

relief

requested

where

the

respondent, Board of Pardons here, fails to "regularly pursue its
authority," as defined by the statute and agency rules in place at
the time in question. The Board of Pardons' own rules require
notice be given and a hearing held prior to rescinding an inmate's
parole date. The rules further provide that the inmate be informed
of the charges against him and the reasons for the Board's ultimate
decision.
3

Northern, however, was not provided with notice, nor was he
given a hearing prior to the rescission of his parole date. He was
also provided with no information concerning the reasons for the
Board's actions. Even for the July 1988 rescission hearing that
confirmed the Board's actions of May 9, the Board did not inform
Northern of any violations or allegations of misconduct. At a time
when the Board could not have claimed extraordinary circumstances,
it still did not comply with

its own rules. The reasonable

inference is that it acted outside the scope of its written
policies and procedures, relying upon its opinion that it could
rescind a parole date at any time for any reason until the moment
an inmate walked out the prison gate. As such, the Board denied
Northern the due process of law required under article I, section
7, of the Utah Constitution, and this court's decision in Foote v.
Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991).
It is clear from this Court's decision in Foote v. Utah Board
of Pardons that the due process clause of the Utah Constitution
applies to the Board of Pardons. This Court stated that:
the parole board is not outside the constitutional
mandate that the actions of government must afford due
process of law.
*

*

*

*

*

*

there is no question that habeas corpus review of the
board of pardons' actions is available.
Id. at 735. However, the Court in Foote left open the question of
"[p]recisely what due process requires of the board of pardons,"
stating that such a determination can only be made "after the facts
concerning the procedures followed by the board are flushed out."
Id.

The facts concerning the procedures followed by the Board in
4

this case have been flushed out through an evidentiary hearing, and
reveal that Northern has been denied due process of law.
a.

The State's reliance on Preece v. House
is misplaced.

The state first cites to Preece v. House, 207 Utah Adv. Rep.
28 (Utah App. 1993), apparently for the proposition that the proper
remedy here would have been an order reguiring the Board of Pardons
to follow its own procedural rules, and provide Northern with a
hearing. Under the state's analysis, because a hearing was held in
July 8, 1988, albeit almost two months after Northern's parole date
had been rescinded, the violation of Northern's due process rights
was somehow remedied. This is simply incorrect.
The decision in Preece, however, is inapposite to the claims
raised by Northern. In Preece an inmate, upon learning that an
incorrect guideline had been applied in setting his release date,
challenged his continued imprisonment past the date which should
have been set if the proper guideline had been applied. Id. at 28.
The Board had affirmed, without written explanation, the release
date set using the incorrect guideline, and the inmate filed a writ
of habeas corpus seeking his release. Id. The district court
thereafter ordered the inmate's release "forthwith." Id.
The Court of Appeals found that although petitioner was
entitled to a written explanation of his parole determination, the
district court exceeded its authority in ordering the release of
the inmate. Id. The Court held that:
the appropriate remedy for the procedural due process
violation found bv the district court in this case is to
require the Board expeditiously to provide the district
5

court and petitioner with a written explanation of its
reasons for the parole decision.
Id. (emphasis added). The court1s holding is a narrow one, based
solely on the "procedural due process violation found by the
district court in [that] case." Id.

Had the court intended its

holding to apply to any and all perceived due process violations,
rather than the narrow violation found by the district court in
that case, it certainly could have drafted its opinion to make such
an intent clear.1

However, in light of the court1s narrow

holding, it cannot be said that the due process violations in
Northern's case could be remedied by a subsequent hearing.
b.

The procedures followed by the Board of
Pardons denied Northern due process of law.

The procedural due process violations here center around the
Board's failure to give timely and proper notice of a decision to
rescind Northernfs May 10, 1988, parole date. The May 1988 Board of
Pardons Rule 310-2 read as follows:
310-2.
Procedure
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date,
information shall be provided to the Board establishing
the basis for the rescission hearing. Upon receipt of
such information, the offender will be scheduled for a
rescission
hearing.
Except
under
extraordinary
circumstances, the offender will be notified of all

1

Northern's case is also distinguishable from Preece in that
Preece was not provided with an explanation by the Board as to
reasons for its decision. Thus, the facts in Preece had not been
flushed out, as petitioner there did not know the procedures used
or facts relied on by the Board in making its determination. In the
instant case the Board did provide a written basis for its
rescission; however, its basis were contrary to law, public policy,
its own policies and rules, and the Utah and United States
Constitutions.
6

allegations and the date of the scheduled hearing at
least seven days in advance.
(emphasis added). The facts of this case demonstrate that there
were no

"extraordinary

circumstances" to justify the Board's

"temporary" rescission. As set forth in Point 2, there was no "new
evidence" that Northern posed a serious risk or danger to society.
In fact, the evidence established the exact opposite.
Moreover, the Board is required to provide Northern with the
seven days notice and hold a hearing prior to rescinding Northern's
parole

date.

Even

assuming,

arguendo,

that

extraordinary

circumstances exist this does not waive the Board's requirement of
providing notice and a hearing, contrary to the state's argument;
it merely permits the hearing to occur on fewer than seven days
notice. Under any circumstances Northern was entitled to some
notice of the allegations against him and he was further entitled
to notice and a hearing prior to having his parole date rescinded.
In Byrnes v. Oregon State Board of Parole. 750 P.2d 499
(Or.App. 1988), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the State
Board of Parole had improperly reset petitioner's prison term by
failing to comply with its own rules regarding proper notice, and
reversed the Board's action. Id. The statute in question provided
that an inmate's prison term determination could be reopened for
one of the grounds enumerated in the statute, such as "substantial
new evidence." Id. at 499-500. After first determining that none of
the enumerated grounds were present, the Court went on to state
that even if one of the enumerated grounds were present, the Board

7

was still bound by the statutory requirement of 14 days1 advance
notice. Id. at 500.
Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court, in Monohan v. Burdman.
530 P.2d 334 (Wash. 1975), recognized that an inmate acquires a
"potential conditional liberty" in a tentative parole release date.
Id. at 338. The Court stated that:
once parole or a promise of parole has been granted in
the form of a tentative release date, we are satisfied
that the prospective parolee enjoys a unique status and
is deserving of minimal due process safeguards before
cancellation of that date for reasons other than failure
to develop an adequate rehabilitation plan.
Id. at 339 (citing cases) . In determining what is meant by "minimum
requirements of due process," the Court looked to the procedures
set forth in Morrissev v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489

(1972),

requiring, inter alia, written notice of the claimed violation, an
opportunity to be heard, and disclosure of evidence to be used
against the parolee. Id.
Two of the most fundamental notions of due process are notice
and a right to be heard. Notice is more than the announcement of a
hearing; for an inmate facing the rescission of his release date,
it is also notice of the nature of the allegations that have
triggered the hearing and caused the Board to consider rescission.
Northern, however, was afforded neither. He was never informed of
the reasons for the temporary rescission nor provided with an
opportunity to be heard until the Board announced its decision on
July 8. A hearing held two months after the fact hardly comports
with

due process

of

law,

let alone the notice

and

hearing

requirements of the Board of Pardons1 own procedural rules.
8

POINT 2
THERE WAS NO NEW EVIDENCE WHICH JUSTIFIED
THE RESCISSION OF NORTHERN'S MAY 10, 1988,
PAROLE DATE.
The Board of Pardons Rule 310 states that a parole date may be
rescinded if "new evidence is presented which shows that the
prisoner, if released, would present a serious risk or danger to
the community." The State claims that "new" evidence existed to
support the rescission of Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date.
Northern however, contends that there was no "new evidence" within
the meaning of Rule 310 to support the Board's action in rescinding
his May 10, 1988, parole date.
a.

The evidence that may have been relied
upon by the Board was not "new" within
the plain meaning of the rule.

A statute or regulation should be construed according to its
plain and literal language. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685,
686

(Utah 1989) . The term "new evidence" must be defined as

evidence which was previously unknown or of recent or fresh origin.
Ready v. United States Parole Commission, 483 F.Supp 1273 (M.D.Pa.
1980); Black's Law Dictionary 940 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "new").
A review of the record shows that the Board had before it three
pieces of information that it may have considered on May 9 as new
evidence.2 The State in its brief does rely on those three pieces
2

Because Board member Paul Boyden refused to disclose the
basis for the Board's decision in his deposition, which was
admitted as substantive testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the
writ, this Court must look to the information the Board had about
its philosophy and sentencing practices in 1988 and the information
the record demonstrates it had about Northern on May 1988 to
determine whether it went outside of its written policies and
9

of "new" evidence as the basis for the rescission of Northern's May
10, 1988 parole date and assumes that the Board did as well, even
though there is a paucity of evidence in the record to support that
conclusion.
The first piece of "evidence" cited is that Northern abused
drugs before, during, and after the commission of his crime in
1980. The Board through its counsel would have us believe that
until the psychological evaluation on May 5, 1988 - which was
specifically characterized as "FAVORABLE" by the evaluator - it was
ignorant of Northern's drug problem.

However, the record reveals

that The Board of Pardons undeniably learned of Northern's drug
problem

in the summer

of 1984; even with that knowledge in

September of 1984 they reaffirmed his May 10, 1988, parole date.
Additionally, the Board, and/or its agents, had ample evidence
of Northern's drug problem prior to May 5, 1988, when they received
Northern's first psychological report. Northern had been receiving
therapy for his drug problem while in prison. Prior to May 5, 1988,
the Board, through Paul Larsen, had been attempting to work out the
details of Northern's parole with authorities in Arizona. Continued
drug therapy was to be a condition of any parole. As Northern has

procedures to rescind Northern's release date. In the former
category fall the sentencing matrices that were developed after
Northern was given his release date in 1981; the Board's policy
under that matrix of giving longer sentences in 1988 for homicides
than the 1981 Board meted out; and its statements to Northern in
the transcript of the July 8 hearing. In the latter category fall
the factual information about Northern that the Board and the
prison had and the dates on which it obtained the information. The
information in these areas, plus the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, give the clearest reason for Northern's rescission.
10

asserted throughout these proceedings, his drug problem, while
arguably evidence, was certainly not "new" within the plain meaning
of the statute.
Finally, an individual's recognition of his or her drug
problem is an important step towards recovery. The Board's action
of punishing such a recognition if such were the case forces an
inmate with a present or past drug problem to make a Hobbesian
choice. Either he continues to deny his drug problem, and thus
seriously hamper any potential recovery, or admit the drug problem,
only to have the Board of Pardons cite this as "new evidence" which
justifies rescinding his parole date.
The second piece of evidence cited by the Board's counsel was
Northern's use of marijuana on February 25, 1988. This "evidence"
was also known to the Board prior to May 1988. A report of this
incident was submitted by the Duchesne Jail, in writing, to the
prison following the incident as monthly reports were submitted to
the prison by the Duchesne Jail regarding Northern. It was known to
the Board prior to May of 1988, and certainly could not be
considered "new" evidence on May 9. The Board of Pardons, through
Paul Larsen, continued in its attempts to work out the details of
Northern's parole supervision with the authorities in Arizona,
prior to May 9, 1988, after the February incident and with full
knowledge of Northern's infraction.
Moreover, subsequent to this incident, the warden of the
Duchesne Jail, also with full knowledge of the February incident,
wrote a favorable recommendation to the Board supporting Northern's
11

release. Had this been the information relied upon by the Board,
the Board would have alleged it as a rule violation, as provided by
Rule 310-1 which, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
The release or rehearing date established by the Board of
Pardons shall remain in effect [except] upon written
referral indicating that the offender is in violation of
the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison,
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local,
state or federal government . . .
Findings of Fact No. 12. The full text is attached to petitioner's
opening brief as Addendum A.
The final piece of evidence allegedly relied on by the Board
was the psychological report dated May 5, 1988. However, the
evaluation specifically noted that the Board of Pardons was to
consider the report "A FAVORABLE ONE." (emphasis original). It was
not "new," i.e. negative evidence, as Judge Hanson defined it. The
report found that Northern had shown a great deal of growth and
maturing and, significantly, he did not have the capacity for
violent acting out. Despite this report, and with no reasonable
basis for finding otherwise, the Board determined Northern to be a
risk to society, and "temporarily" rescinded his parole date.
Not

satisfied

with

the

results

of

this

May

5,

1988,

psychological report and wanting a negative report, the Board
ordered another evaluation. Contrary to the wishes of the Board,
this evaluation also came back favorable. Neither report revealed
any evidence that suggested Northern presented "a serious risk or
danger to the community." In fact, perhaps the best evidence that
Northern was not a risk to society is evidenced by the two years
preceding May 1988, when he was at the Duchesne Jail working as a
12

trustee. In that capacity, Northern was assigned to work, for
extended periods of days and weeks, virtually unsupervised, on a
rural farm owned by an elderly woman. During the period from 1986
thru May 1988, he worker in other unguarded areas. He did so
without incident. An individual posing such a "risk to society"
would

surely

either

have

not

been

given

such

freedom

and

responsibility, or would not have performed so well in the local
community. Yet the Board appears to have ignored this information.
Not to be denied, the Board of Pardons scheduled a hearing for
July 8, 1988, almost two months after Northern's original parole.
The Board found Northern posed a risk to society and that more time
was required so that his punishment would fit his crime, thereby
formally rescinding his May 10, 1988, parole date.
As a final coup de grace, the Board in 1992 imposed a twenty
six thousand three hundred fifty dollar ($26,350.00) restitution
order on Northern. It did so despite the fact that from 1980 thru
May 9, 1988, restitution had never been ordered by the Board. It
did so without notice to Northern or his attorney (whom it refused
to allow to appear) . And it did so without a scintilla of evidence
supporting the award, which it based on pure speculation of what
the widow of the victim would have had to pay for child care if she
had used child care after the death of her husband. The best and
most current evidence about child care is in the 1980 ninety-day
evaluation of Northern, in which Mrs. Hamby noted that she had
begun to care for children to earn extra money.

13

In setting aside the July 1988 order, the Court ought also
void the restitution order of 1992, which was improvidently and
unlawfully

entered.

Even

if

the

Court

somehow

affirms

the

rescission order, it should void this speculative, unsupported
restitution order.
b.

The

The Board of Pardons acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner in denying Northern
his May 10, 1988, parole date.
actions

of

the Board

of

Pardons,

in

"temporarily"

rescinding Northern's parole date on May 9, 1988, and formally
denying it at the July 8, 1988, hearing, were so arbitrary and
capricious as to deny Northern due process of law. It is well
recognized in the federal system that a decision by the Parole
Commission may be reversed where the actions of the Commission are
shown to be arbitrary and capricious and have no rational basis in
the record, see e.g. Misasi v. United States Parole Commission, 835
F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 1987); Fiumara v. O'Brien, 889 F.2d 254,
257 (10th Cir. 1989); Montoya v. United States Parole Commission,
908 F.2d 635, 637 (10th Cir. 1990); Dallas v. Martin, 929 F.2d 587,
589 (10th Cir. 1991).

Differences between the federal parole system and Utah parole
system notwithstanding, the same principles which apply in the
federal system regarding arbitrary and capricious acts of the
Parole Commission also apply to the Board of Pardons in Utah. The
Board of Pardons is bound by the due process clause of article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution, which is identical to the due
process clause in the United States Constitution at issue in the
14
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this

Board, even in reaching substantive decisions, as such decisions
must be rendered in accordance with due process of law and not in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Furthermore, and contrary to the State's assertion, Northern
is not directly challenging the Board's substantive decision,
except as he attacks the procedures and underpinnings used by the
Board in reaching the decision. Therefore, no separation of powers
problem exits. As set forth by this court in Foote, the Board of
Pardons actions are clearly subject to some judicial review. When
due process rights are implicated it is this Court's prerogative,
as the final arbiter of state constitutional issues, to determine
whether an individual has been denied due process of law.

CONCLUSION
Northern asks this court to decide whether, in light of the
record, he was afforded the requisite due process of law, and
whether the Board "regularly pursued its authority" in so acting,
or whether the actions of the Board in rescinding his May 1988
parole date was the result of a Board's determinations that it had
authority unfettered by an inmate's constitutional safeguards. If
an inmate has no liberty interest in a parole date, if the Board
may violate or circumvent its written policies and procedures
without any consequence or restraint, and if the Board of Pardons
may rescind an inmate's parole date for any reason all, (such as
disagreeing with a prior Board's action) - or for no reason - until
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the moment an i nmate passes through the prison gate
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Northern loses.
Nil)

I II II If III III

I I I III I I I 1

III I I |H " ' l l

own policies ami proceduii"

I III i l l

III

in I il

1 III

II

Ill I I l"

!

Ill

Il ill I III

ill

Ill

I 1 >

denial to him of I lit; due

process protections afforded him by the Utah State Constitution and
thif

i i HI ni mi II

I I ni "i i ' . i i

ill

n
i n
i n
i I uuU 1

y,

ULdli

tiuaid

ul

JHaidmts

i III III

comi m
i i finding arid correction of error, Accordingly, Northern
asks this court to render the Board's actions in the July ^
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DATED this

/£*^

day
*~~ct£ully submitted,
_ STOLEBARGER

Jo cSrol Nesset-Sale
Attorney for Petitioner
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